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Human biography –  
the arena of democratic negotiations1
Democracy has never had good press. Even though it has been loved and fervently de-
fended, it has always had problems with theory. Since the beginning of political thought, 
the argumentation “against” has always prevailed over the argumentation “for”. Every-
one will find it easy to recall something from the long list of objections. For example, 
that the fundamental concept of equality for this system is, delicately speaking, non-em-
pirical, that the assumption about the majority being more often right than wrong is 
a hardly plausible hypothesis, or that it is really hard to believe that mechanisms un-
derlying a collective decision can have anything to do with reason. This list could be 
continued for a long time. Well, it has been agreed anyway that there is no better idea 
(Karłowicz, 2017: 172).
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The subject-matter of this paper is an attempt to outline 
the type of relationship that exists between democracy and 
the autonomous and responsible individual as a necessary 
pre-condition for a real and genuine community. The au-
thor’s reflections are focused around the idea that only 
a conscious, inner-directed and mature individual can 
guarantee a solid foundation for the rules and practice of 
democracy and that human biography is the actual arena 
of democratic negotiations constantly being undertaken.
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If we accept a statement about the theoretical difficulties of democracy, what 
should we say about practical signs and methods of its functioning, about forms 
of its institutional and social incarnations that often reveal their problematic and 
weak character? Paradoxically, however, the stronger the tensions arising in the 
field of the democratic praxis that turn it into an element of unpredictable and 
difficult processes and reactions and the larger the extent to which the democratic 
spirit becomes eroded and weakened, the higher the awareness of the importance 
and meaning of democratic values and the stronger the attachment to democratic 
principles. The answer to the question that appears on such occasions – how to 
save democracy – seems to be obvious on the first impulse of the mind and heart: 
by cultivating principles that are important for the community and organise its life 
in social practice.
It seems, however, that the point lies deeper, that the original remedy for 
this situation should be sought in activities and measures aimed at reinforcing 
the individual so that he/she would achieve such a degree of internal autonomy 
that will make him/her an inner-directed and responsible individual and citizen. 
In other words, the biography of an individual human being is the basic “area” 
and “environment” in which the condition of democracy is set. It is the individ-
ual biography that becomes the fundamental arena of democratic negotiations – 
a kind of agora on which efforts and attempts constantly resumed by the indi-
vidual find expression, aiming at the achievement of inner freedom, self-steering 
and the ability to make creative decisions and to assume responsibility for the 
form and quality of his/her being. The individual biography, as some kind of ex-
istential pact constantly remaining in statu nascendi, a sincere conversation with 
oneself, suspended between poles of confidence and doubt, hope and scepticism, 
between reasons of the mind and passions, a persistent and relentless dialogue 
with the ambiguous and ambivalent world and a reflexive effort to add value 
to one’s own experiences, is a specific attempt to agree upon and construct, on 
a microscale and in the space of contradictory and sometimes almost mutually 
exclusive arguments, some superior meaning and sense that finally determines 
the choice made by the individual and his/her attachment to specific principles. 
However, as Władysław Stróżewski notices, this choice and these principles con-
stitute themselves on the basis of 
[…] a more primary experience: the experience of a specific power within me that I can use 
in this or another way: make use of its existence or not and, by using it, direct it towards 
certain goals. Things become complicated: the original alternative refers not to the object 
of choice, but to my own attitude: it expresses itself in the opposition: I can – I cannot and, 
further, I want – I do not want (1992: 50–51).
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Within the scope of the biographic project, the image of the Self forms and 
a subjective individual way of thinking about oneself and one’s own identity, and 
the understanding of the surrounding world and of the character of social interac-
tions develops. The unique, inherently human skill and ability to situate one’s own 
personal experience, on the one hand, in the most inner perspective (ad intra) and, 
on the other hand, in the perspective of ad extra – potential references towards 
others comes to the fore. Both vectors intersect in the individual horizon and con-
front themselves in the space of acts of reasoning and thinking, in the sphere of 
subjectively grounded feeling, individual sensitivity and evaluation. In this way, 
the individual Self becomes a specific, particular space for dialogue and the nego-
tiation of multiple meanings and senses, a kind of ‘dynamic structure consisting of 
many autonomous subjective positions’ (Roszkowska, 2011: 64).
It can be said that the biographical range of the individual existence, being 
some kind of microbiography, is a ‘network of subtle dependencies’ remaining 
in the process of continuous negotiation and internal dialogue (Demetrio, 2000: 
147). These dependencies find expression in the process of constantly resumed ne-
gotiational dialogue that should lead to the achievement of mature freedom by the 
individual along with responsibility for decisions and actions being undertaken. 
Only such free and responsible individuals can create a true community. In order 
to be able to create a community, we must create first ourselves and our personal 
modus of being with our whole being. It is a sine qua non condition, a feedback 
and the most important dimension constituting the form of “us” as a community.
To create oneself within the scope of one’s own biography, which is perceived 
as the arena of constant negotiations, is to ask about the freedom of choice and 
decision and about the possibility of crossing the borders and what they contain. 
However, it is not only a question of the purely technical translocation process, 
but primarily of looking or justifications and reasons for this transgression. The 
human being begins to understand whom he/she could be and whom he/she could 
become to the extent to which he/she is himself/herself – that is, a self-conscious 
individual. In the process of internal dialogue, a specific sort of soliloqium, he/she 
achieves his/her own way of existence that opens up to relations of belonging and 
reciprocity towards another human being and towards others.
In the process of negotiations with various needs, desires and rights and with 
moral aspects of life being conducted by the individual within the space of one’s 
own biography, he/she grows up to understand that, as Roger Scruton writes: 
[…] society is a common heritage for which we learn to restrict our desires and to perceive 
our place in reality as a link of the constant chain of giving and taking and to understand 
that we do not have any right to destroy the goods inherited by us. This is because there 
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exists a line of obligation between us and those who have given us what we have, and the 
prolongation of this line is an expression of our care about the future. We consider the 
future of our community not through the calculation of costs and profits, but more spe-
cifically; namely, we perceive ourselves as heirs of benefits that we are obliged to pass on 
further (2016: 45).
Referring later to Edmund Burke, Scruton notices that he believed that the 
relationships on which society is based – the ones that create its democratic ethos 
of functioning – can be built only from below, through face-to-face interactions. 
It is in the family, in clubs and association, at school, at work, in the church, in 
the team, in the regiment and at university that people learn to interact with 
others as free individuals who take responsibility for their own actions and are 
accountable to others (Scruton, 2016: 46). This grassroots development of the so-
cial dimension of life, arising from inherent human needs, becomes represented 
in the individual biography, in answers being obtained on the plane of personal 
experiences to questions of crucial importance from the perspective of human 
dignity and the timeless desire for a good and happy life, with the attitude of 
responsibility and trust on the one hand and with the attitude of temperance and 
sui generis fundamental restriction of one’s own egoism on the other hand. Only 
in terms of behaviours and ways of living in which the human being confronts 
his/her own Self, is he/she able to make a personal, rationally motivated choice 
and is he/she ready to fulfil his own way of living in a community with and for 
others.
Thomas Hobbes formulated the following paramount idea of the social con-
tract: ‘there [is] no obligation on any man which arises not from some act of his 
own’ (Hobbes, 2009: 303). It implies that the essence of obligations, rules, princi-
ples and standards present in social space is preceded by and made conditional 
upon an internal act negotiated in the free process of subjective dialogue. We could 
ask if this is really so? The answer seems simple and clear on the level of condi-
tion: this is what should be, but more complex on the level of empiricism and 
the facts. If this is not so, all turbulences taking place in democratic systems that 
lead to its negation and rejection in their most extreme form find their explana-
tion exactly here. The democratic spirit should be upheld by a free individual that 
is able to manage his/her own life independently that treats himself/herself and 
others with respect. This individual, for whom his/her own and others’ personal 
freedom should be the highest value and a sort of limes, bears moral responsibility 
for which values he/he will choose to implement with the use of this freedom. The 
truly free society is a community of responsible people.
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The issue of the human being as an individual entity perceived in the context of 
his/her communal existence as co-existing with and for others is always ultimately 
decided in democracy. The democratic reality is an invitation to go a certain way; 
it is sui generis a game, a game of individual freedoms, a game of choice between 
various possibilities, options and values. It also summons us to assume a specific 
way of living and opens some kind of space that is entered by an individual entity 
whose understanding of concrete good and a happy life stimulates the will to act 
and mobilises creative powers. In this way, the human being seems to participate 
in the process of special movement and is ready to make certain sacrifices, some-
times even suffer, for the complete self-fulfilment of his/her own being. However, 
he is also ready to impose self-limitations on his own claims, to “suspend” them in 
the name of solidarity and empathy.
Why does this happen? In the name of what reasons and principles, is he/she 
able to do this? This happens because he feels a conscious and autonomous indi-
vidual – a citizen who adheres to the principle of reciprocity based on the recogni-
tion of rights and claims of other people so that they could also express and fulfil 
their rights and claims. As Piotr Augustyniak notices: 
An authentically awakened society is not just a society awakened by energies penetrating 
them, but a society that is able to control such energies and guide them in a sovereign way. But 
this calls for the recognition of these powers and their critical evaluation. And this is where we 
reach the heart of the matter: this kind of collective consciousness is possible only when a socie- 
ty consists of individuals who have achieved empowerment in their individual life. Only such 
individuals are not only engaged in action, but they do so as a result of their own reflection 
and, consequently, conscious individual decisions. Thus, social awakening is authentic only 
when it is based on individual consciousness, attitude and activity that is usually called civil. 
An awakened society is a society of free and sovereign individuals – entities (2019: 32–33).
However, this is also based on the forming supra-individual principle that 
[…] the collective self-consciousness of the entire society is characterised by concern for 
the common good. Citizenship is a specific world-view and disposition of the civil society 
that arises from the participation of individuals in its collective self-consciousness. Citi-
zenship produces in a sense of attachment to society as a whole, which manifests itself in 
decisions and actions aimed at the protection and multiplication of the good of the entire 
society. Citizenship is a cognitive and normative attitude and a corresponding model of 
action; it is an attitude where the personality of the individual consciously allows him/her 
to participate in the collective personality that restricts and affects his/her decisions and 
actions. Citizenship is the acceptance of the obligation to act (at least to some extent) for 
the common good at the time of making decisions concerning contradictory interests or 
ideals. It imposes an obligation to consider the consequences of individual actions for the 
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common good or society as a whole. Collective self-consciousness – the awareness that 
others participate with me in the same “us” contains also a normative requirement – obli-
gation – of solidarity and the resulting mutual obligation of all people participating in it as 
members of the given society (Shils, 1994: 11–12). 
This brings forth an important principle of mutual care for each other, a funda-
mental rule specifying the co-existence of free and responsible individuals that can 
be summarised to the deeply realised belief that we exist not only for ourselves, but 
also, maybe even primarily, with and for others both in the world and in society.
Let us conclude our reflections with words of Ralf Dahrendorf, who notices: 
There is no doubt that political democracy and market economy are cold projects. They 
are civilisational inventions of enlightened minds and populations, but they do not make 
the heart beat faster – in fact, they should not. They are problem-solving mechanisms cre-
ated in order to enable a change of tastes, policy or even leaders without bloodshed and 
unnecessary suffering. They are wonderful inventions as such and, not without a reason, 
they are highly appreciated. But they are not “home”; they do not give an identity or a sense 
of belonging to the human being. In this sense, they leave him/her behind the door, out in 
the cold, without shelter. Democracy and market economy are important, but not all-im-
portant. And there is a consideration of even larger importance. It seems that mechanisms 
of open society cannot be maintained if people do not know where they belong (1996: 9). 
The knowledge where they belong and what results from this is something that 
they gain in the intra-individual negotiation process whose arena (agora) is their 
own mind and their own biography.
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